Spearmans Rank Correlation Essay Example for Free

Spearmans Rank Correlation Essay I can therefore predict that if a student that spends less than 20 hours in front of the TV can have a KS2 Total of 16. In addition, a student that has a KS2 Total of 17 could spend 40 hours in front of the television. HYPOTHESIS 3 This hypothesis is comparing the IQ of boys and girls against their KS2 Total. This means that I am trying to carry out an investigation that is based on the better performer at school and this is either boys or girls. My hypothesis states that boys perform better that girls at school but I will confirm that with the use of scatter diagrams and Spearmans Rank Correlation. This graph is comparing the IQ of females against their KS2 Total. From the above graph, I can see that there is a positive correlation and this therefore disproves my hypothesis because I did not expect girls to do very well in their KS2 exams. Nevertheless, to be very confident with my hypothesis, I will have to carry out a Spearmans Rank Correlation Test to check whether these two factors actually work with each other. I have drawn a line of best fit and this gives me a rather accurate correlation of the comparisons that I am carrying out. This is Spearmans Rank Number. Since my data was too much, I print-screened the important part, which was the actual calculations itself. When I carried out Spearmans Rank Correlation, I got a strong positive correlation, which meant that girls with a high IQ would also have a high KS2 Total. This also tells me that I interpreted my scatter graph rightly because I saw that there was a strong positive correlation. This graph is comparing the IQ of males against their KS2 Total. From the above graph, I can see that there is a strong positive correlation and this therefore proves my hypothesis because I did expect boys to do very well in their KS2 exams. Significantly, to be very confident with my hypothesis, I will have to carry out a Spearmans Rank Correlation Test to check whether these two factors actually work with each other. I have drawn a line of best fit and this gives me a rather accurate correlation of the comparisons that I am carrying out. This is Spearmans Rank Number. Since my data was too much, I print-screened the important part, which was the actual calculations itself. When I carried out Spearmans Rank Correlation, I got a strong positive correlation, which meant that boys who have a high IQ would also have a high KS2 Total. This also tells me that I have interpreted my scatter graph rightly because I saw that there was a strong positive correlation. After carrying out the last hypothesis, I can finally conclude that both boys and girls perform very well at school. Notably, I noticed that girls had a correlation of 0. 9 while boys had 0. 8. This also tells me that although they both perform well at school; girls have that slight advantage over the boys. STANDARD DEVIATION I will be using this formula to find the Standard Deviation of my data. This is because since my data is not in a grouped format, I will not be able to use the formula for grouped data but can use the formula for ungrouped data. I have decided to find the Standard Deviation of IQ because I feel that that has an effect on KS2 Totals. This is the Standard Deviation of my data for the IQ of females. As you can see from the print-screened data, I have carried out the steps to calculate the deviation of IQ in Mayfield High School. When calculating, I found out the average IQ of females in the school was 100. 275 and that is approximately 100. After more calculations, I found out that the Standard Deviation of IQ for females in the school is 10. This therefore meant that girls in the school have a high IQ and that they would have few students who are outside the outlier range (upper warning limit and lower warning limit). This is the Standard Deviation of my data for the IQ of females. As you can see from the print-screened data, I have carried out the steps to calculate the deviation of IQ in Mayfield High School. When calculating, I found out the average IQ of males in the school was 13726. 803 and that is approximately 13727. After more calculations, I found out that the Standard Deviation of IQ for males in the school is 19. This therefore meant that boys in the school have a high IQ and that they would have more students that the girls who are outside the outlier range (upper warning limit and lower warning limit). PLAN A I will draw a scatter graph to display my results. The reason why I have chosen this is that I expect it to show me the correlation between IQ, Average number of TV watched and KS2 Total. When I had completed my scatter graph, I noticed that there was a strong-positive correlation. I drew a line of best fit and noticed that it passed through the Upper Quartile IQ. In addition, I noticed a few outliers. This occurred when a student had a high IQ but had a low KS2 Total. PLAN B I will calculate the correlation by using Spearmans Rank Correlation. The reason why I am doing this is that it will enable me to see what type of correlation there is between IQ, KS2 Total and Average TV watched in a week. CONCLUSION I will say that this investigation does follow my hypothesis apart from me having a few outliers. Moreover, I will say that the outliers that I got did not make much difference to the results that I got. In addition, I think that I could have tried other methods such as using samples such as a simple random sample, Stem and Leaf Diagrams or cluster sampling that involves selecting the sample units in groups The limitations that I feel occurred during the process when I was carrying out this coursework is that there was not much time available to me so I just used two different ways to test out my hypothesis rather that using maybe three ways. In addition, I can say that if I had more time, I could have used more data and have varied the samples so that my results could be more accurate. I could also collect my own data because I can ensure reliability and have a varied source of data from different schools. This would help me because I can see if my hypothesis affects all the schools or some schools. If there were to be any more work that I would add to this work, I would use a variety of methods to test out my hypothesis.

The Zero Crossing Detector Engineering Essay

The Zero Crossing Detector Engineering Essay The X 10 transmitter sends data timed with the zero crossing of the power line, thus each unit needs to have a built-in zero crossing detectors. Mainly, the X10 manufactures are using PIC16F8XXX family to detect zero crossing by applying the external interrupt on the RB0 pin, which links to the power line through 5M resistance (to limit the current into the PICmicro) as it is shown in the figure 00. The PICmicro has a protection diodes which are designed to clamp any voltage higher than VDD or lower than VSS. Thus, when a negative half cycle of the AC voltage is applied, the RB0 pin clamps the voltage to VSS 0.5V, this can be interpreted as a logic-0. At the same time, as the AC voltage rises to or over VDD, the logical value will become logic-1. RB-0 is configured for external interrupts, whereas the input buffer is a Schmitt trigger. Therefore, the input threshold (0.2 VDD = 1V) on the falling edge and (0.8 VDD = 4V) on a rising edge. So there is an interrupt occurs on every zero crossing. The following equation is used to calculate the RB0 pin state which will change in relative to the zero crossing V = Vpk*sin(2*Ġ¢*f*t), where Vpk = 320Vand f = 50 Hz On the rising edge, RB0 can go high about 64  µ s after the zero-crossing. However, on the falling edge, it can go low about 16 ÃŽ ¼s before the zero-crossing. 120 kHz Carrier Generator X-10 transmitters use 1msec bursts of a 120 kHz to send information over 50 Hz power lines. Different techniques could be used in order to generate 120 kHz, however, in x10 units are mainly use one of the PICmicro MCUs CCP modules as it is shown in the figure100. The CCP (Capture/Compare/PWM) module of PIC 16F67xA is used in PWM mode to produce a 120 kHz square-wave with a half duty cycle of (50% of the duty cycle). In order to generate the carrier frequency of 120 kHz, the system oscillator capacity was chosen to be 7.680 MHz, Where the frequency of the PWM is the inverse of the period (1/period) And since one instruction is taking four oscillation periods we come up with the term of 4Tosc Main oscillator is 7.680MHz, Tosc = 1/7.680MHz PWM period = 1/120 kHz = 8.333 µs PWM period = [(PR2) + 1] * 4 * Tosc * (TMR2 prescale value) = [(0) + 1] * 4 * 1/7.680MHz * (16) = 8.333 µs After initialization, the CCP (Capture/Compare/PWM) is always enabled, and the register TRISC bit is used to gate On and Off the PWM output. By sitting the TRISC bit = 1, then the pin is an input and the 120 kHz signal is blocked and not accessible to the pin, other than When the TRISC bit = 0, the pin becomes an output and the 120 kHz signal is free and coupled to the AC power line. Before the 120 kHz coupled to the powerline, it will pass through 200à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ resistance, a transistor amplifier and high pass filter as depicted in the Figure 5. Since the impedance of a capacitor is Zc = 1/(2*Ġ¢*f*C), If f = 120kHz Zc = 1/(2*Ġ¢*120k*0.1*10-6) If f = 50kHz Zc = 1/(2*Ġ¢*50k*0.1*10-6) The capacitor of the high pass filter is equal to 0.1 ÃŽ ¼F which presents low impedance to the 120 kHz carrier frequency, but with 50 Hz power line frequency it will present high impedance. Therefore high pass filter will safely couple the 120 kHz signal to the 50 Hz power line. Finally, the 12 kHz signal should well match with the synchronize of zero crossing with maximum delay about 300 ÃŽ ¼s from the zero-crossing to the beginning of the X-10 envelope in order to be compatible with other x10 receiver. Since the maximum delay of the zero-crossing detector = 64 ÃŽ ¼s 300 ÃŽ ¼s 64 ÃŽ ¼s = 236 ÃŽ ¼s Thus the firmware must begin the transmission of the 120 kHz envelope with maximum time of 236 ÃŽ ¼s after detection of the zero-crossing to. 120 kHz Carrier Detector In order to receive a x10 signal, it is essential to detect the presence of the 120 kHz signal on the 50Hz AC power line. This application requires a specific hardware structure which? contains three blocks placed between the PIC and the power line and subsequence the 120 kHz carrier will bass through all of them to reached RC pin of the PIC. The first block from the power line side is the decoupling capacitor which contains e a 0.1 µ capacitor in parallel with 1Mà ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ resistance. The next one is the high bass filter and the final one is the envelop detector which is connected to the PC pin of the PIC as it shown in figureXX. Since the impedance of a decoupling capacitor is Zc = 1/ (2*Ġ¢*f*C), If f = 120 kHz Zc = 1/ (2*Ġ¢*120k*0.1*10-6) =1/ 0.075 = 13.26 à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ Zc of 120 kHz = 13.26 à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ If f = 50 kHz Zc = 1/ (2*Ġ¢*50*0.1*10-6) = 1/3110^-6 = 32.25 k à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ Zc of 50 Hz = 32.25 k à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ The capacitor of the decoupling filter is equal to 0.1 ÃŽ ¼ farad which is presenting low impedance (13.26 à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦) to the 120 kHz carrier frequency, but with 50 Hz power line frequency it will present high impedance (32.25 k à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦). Therefore the decoupling filter will safely couple the 120 kHz signal detector to the 50 Hz power line and allow only 120 kHz to bass through it. The next block is another high pass filter, design an RC filter that will pass only 120 kHz carrier and attenuate the entire 50Hz. The second high pass filter scheme is shown below Where the high pass filter characteristics is shown in the next scheme ωp is the passband edge of the high pass filter ωp = 1 / CR where C = 150 pF and R = 33 k à ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ ωp = 2 Ġ¢ fp fp = 1 / 2*Ġ¢*C*R fp = 1/(2*3.14*33*10^3*150*10^-9). fp = 32 kHz. Where, fp is the frequency of the passband edge that will assures all the 50 Hz signal is completely attenuated, at the same time as the 120 kHz signal is passed through the filter to the amplifier stages. The signals are inter the amplifier stage with a value between ten millivolts to a few hundred millivolts. The module must amplify the carrier to certain limit and converted to a logic level signal that the PIC can detect. The amplification, however, must be carefully selected in order to prevent the signal will pass through the first stage which is the tuned amplifier stage where the 120 kHz signal is amplified by using a series of 4069UB inverters to configure as high gain amplifiers. The tuned amplifiers operate with peak response at 120 kHz at the first two stages while the next two stages are untuned amplifier but provide additional amplification. The amplified 120 kHz signal is passed to the envelope detector block which is containing a diode, capacitor, and resistor. The out put of the envelope detector is buffered through an inverter and finally the inverse of the amplified 120 kHz is presented to an input pin (RC3) of the PIC16F8xxx. When the zero crossing is interrupt the RC3 will checked to see whether or not the carrier is present within the 1 ms transmission envelope. A stream of 1 volt is representing the presence of the carrier while 0 is the absence of the carrier. Transformerless Power Supply X10 modules used PIC16F877A or any other PIC requires a 5V supply to feed the board circuit. Since X-10 units are intended to be plugged into a wall outlet, a transformerless power supply is used to provide the require voltage. There are two significant characteristics of transformerless supplies that should be kept in mind: lack of isolation from the 240 volt AC and limited current capacity. Figure00 illustrates the transformerless power supply diagram used in this application. As it shown in figure00, a 220v VDR (voltage dependent resistor) being and connected between Line and Neutra to protect the circuit from spikes on the AC power line. 1Mà ¢Ã¢â‚¬Å¾Ã‚ ¦ resister connects in parallel with two capacitors to provide a discharge path for the voltage left on the capacitors when the module is unplugged from the wall. The voltage across 1000Mfarad was rectified by using two diodes and finally a 5.1V Zener diode to produce a 5V supply for the circuit. Load Switch There are two options to control a mains rated load, either to use a Triac or a relay. Electrical designers used relays in many different applications because they are suitable for very high power loads and very low power loads also when the main rated load need to be isolated and finally when the load require a relatively slow toggling rates. A Triac is the best option for switching non isolated medium power loads and they have a rapid switching capability and subsequence they are very suitable for dimming and lamp control. x10 manufacturer used a Triac as a load switch of the x10 units because its medium power switching capacity and most of the home appliances are consumes a medium power. In addition, Triacs are an inexpensive three-terminal device designed to switch a medium current load and has been used extensively in home appliances such as lamp dimmers and motor speed controllers. The main two terminals M1 and M2 are wired in series with the load figure00. A Triac is, three-te rminal device that acts as a high-speed, bidirectional AC switch, two terminals, MT1 and MT2, are wired in series with the load. A small trigger current between MT1 and the gate allow conduction to occur between MT2 and MT1.when the latching occur between M1 and M2, the load current continues to flow even after the gate current is disconnected, as long as the load current exceeds the latching value. Therefore, when the 50Hz AC voltage falls below the latching voltage near each zero-crossing, the Triac will automatically switch off. There are two ways to maintain the load current beyond each single half cycle of the 50Hz AC supply, either the gate current have to be maintained continuously or the triac have to be retriggered each half-cycle of 50Hz. the advantage of the pulse trigger is that only lower average current is required. Typically, the trigger pulse duration must be long enough for the load current in order to reach the latching current. A L4008L6 Triac was selected for X10 module because it has a sensitive gate that the logic level output of the PIC MCU I/O pin will directly control it. Although, the PIC MCU can provide only positive voltages to the gate, the sensitive gate Triac can control the alternative AC current in both directions through the device. A lamp dimmer can be created by including a delay between the time that the trigger current is provided to the Triac from the PIC MCU and the time of each zero-crossing. In other words, TRIACs can be used to control the brightness of a light by switching the 50Hz AC power on part-way through each half cycle (Figure 2 and Figure 3). Therefore x10 maker allows the PIC MCU to directly drive the gate of a TRIAC through a current limiting resistor. By controlling the power-line cycle, the PIC MCU can control the average voltage across the lamp, and therefore the brightness . . .(unclear) http://www3.telus.net/Whalco/SDim.htm ftp://ftp.efo.ru/pub/cypress/psoc/capsense/app/TD-AN_LampDimmerAppNote.pdf http://www.freescale.com/files/microcontrollers/doc/app_note/AN2839.pdf

Its the Cake Essay -- Creative Creativity Essays

It's the Cake The title above comes from a comment made by author Jerry Hirschberg. "Creative activity [isn't] the icing on the cake. Human creativity is the cake." Getting a bite of this cake is what proves to be frustrating for some people. Simply put, there isn't one sure-fire method to achieve creative success. However, there are certainly underlying attitudes and patterns that one can perceive in creative people, (and in this most humble of papers), I will attempt to show to you through texts such as Hirschberg's The Creative Priority and my own forays with Madame Creatividad that experiencing creativity is simply a matter of opening yourself up to the world around you. It always seems to me that any measure of creativity starts through something that I have opted to call creative flux, both because I am nerdy and that it happens to fit the concept extremely well. In a nutshell, all creative flux means is that you has to be willing to be open to the surrounding environment, allowing ideas from all possible angles and points to flow into you. Hirschberg illustrates this rather well. A car designer by trade, he started his career at GM, "the supreme icon of power and success for America." He tells us that GM eventually reached a point of stagnation, from lack of competition and from shutting the doors tight on ideas coming from the outside world. GM car design reached a monotone complacency, and it is at this point, Hirschberg says, he began feeling a little bit useless, as his work environment had turned into, "a blinding illusion of security and imperviousness to failure." Hirschberg then makes a transition: he switches jobs to a place of unregulated creative flux. He attributes his later success t... ...hberg calls this process `stepping back from the canvas.' And a gloriously effective technique it turns out to be, "...ideas again started flowing, knotty problem areas unraveled, and the design began to lead the designers, a sure sign that a strong concept was emerging." Something similar to this happened to me in the process of writing this essay, as I acquired a major case of writer's block. Thankfully, I took Hirschberg's advice to heart: I `stood back from the canvas' and succeeded in opening the floodgates of creative flux anew. So is creative flux the path to taking a bite out of the all elusive cake of creativity? Although it is not the only way to approach creative problems, it is the phenomenal openness that creative flux provides that makes for such an exciting tool in one's quest for achieving creative goals. So go ahead, open up and take a bite.

Parallels between The Movie, The Matrix and Platos Allegory Of The Cav

Parallels between The Movie, "The Matrix" and Plato's Allegory Of The Cave In Book VII of The Republic, Plato tells a story entitled "The Allegory Of The Cave." He begins the story by describing a dark underground cave where a group of people are sitting in one long row with their backs to the cave's entrance. Chained to their chairs from an early age, all the humans can see is the distant cave wall in from of them. Their view of reality is soley based upon this limited view of the cave which but is a poor copy of the real world. In addition to the chained people, there are other people in the cave. Plato refers to them as the puppet-handlers and they are the ones holding those in the cave captive. (It is important to realize that the prisoners do not realize this--in fact, the prisoners do not even realize that they are being held captive since this existence is all they have ever known.) Walking behind the prisoners, the puppet-handlers hold up various objects found in the real world. Due to a fire that is burning the mouth of the cave, the prisoners are able to see the objects and each other only as distorted, flickering shadows on the cavern wall in front of them. Unfortunately, the prisoners can not see the actual objects or the puppet-makers because they are unable to turn their heads. From childhood, "...their legs and necks [have been] in bonds so that they are fixed, seeing only [what is] in front of them.... As Plato goes on to later explain, "the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images." The movie, "The Matrix," parallels Platos's Allegory Of The Cave in a number of ways. Similar to the prisoners of the cave, the humans trapped in the matrix (the cave) only see what the machines (the modern day puppet-handlers) want them to see. They are tricked into believing that what they hear in the cave and see before them is the true reality that exists. Furthermore, they accept what their senses are telling them and they believe that what they are experiencing is all that really exists--nothing more. However, Neo is forced to face a painful truth when he is removed from the pod that has kept him trapped in the virtual reality of the matrix. Neo discovers that what he has been presented with his entire life is only reflections, or merely shadows of the truth. This theme is carried throughout the movie as we see ... ...yone to take them out of the cave. They would fight to stay in the cave because it is the only world they have ever known and it is where they feel safe. In "The Matrix," Cypher kills several people in his quest to go back to the matrix (the cave). Morpheus tells Neo the same thing in regard to the humans still plugged or trapped in the world of the matrix. "You have to understand, most of these people are not ready to be unplugged [forced out of the matrix--the cave]. And many of them are so inert, so hopelessly dependent on the system that they will fight to protect it." Society's Role In Our Lives In conclusion, Plato's story of the cave brings up many philosophical points and most importantly, addresses the issue of society's role in our lives. To some degree, we are all influenced by the thoughts and actions of others; however, at the same time, we have the ability to question, draw our own conclusions, and ultimately make our own choices. As Trinity tell Neo, "The Matrix can not tell you who you are." By being courageous enough to turn around and take the red pill, we, just like Neo and the Freed Man, are making the first step towards personal independence.

Feminist Theory - There is No One Definition of Woman Essay -- Femini

Feminist Theory - There is No One Definition of Woman When posed with the question â€Å"What is woman?† it seems a daunting task to lay an umbrella statement to describe an entire gender. Upon further reflection, however, it seems that this overwhelming inability to answer the question, may in fact, be the answer to the question itself. Within the past two decades Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman, Caroline Whitbeck, Geraldine Finn, and Helene Cixous have addressed the meaning of woman. There is not a concrete answer to â€Å"What is woman?† either produced by women or produced through men’s perceptions of women. The message of Lugones and Spelman in Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for â€Å"The Woman’s Voice,† is that the entire worldwide experience of women cannot be universally articulated. Blanket definition of woman is impossible due to the many characteristics of women that make the gender so diverse, specifically race and economic status in society. â€Å"The women’s voices most likely to come forth and the women’s voices mostly likely to be heard are, in the United States anyway, those of white, middle-class, heterosexual Christian women† (Lugones and Spelman 21). Since â€Å"feminist theory† has been established without encompassing the inherently different experiences of non-white/non-Anglo women â€Å"much of the theory has failed to be relevant to the lives of women who are not white or middle class† (Ibid. 21). This displacement of a large population of the worldâ⠂¬â„¢s women from feminist theory is extremely threatening to the development of a woman’s voice, in so far as this voice is key to fighting the battles that feminism sets out to fight: the end of re... ...a Cohen. The Signs Reader: Women, Gender and Scholarship. Edited by Elizabeth and Emily Abel. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 1983. 279-297. Finn, Geraldine. On the Oppression of Women in Philosophy – Or, Whatever Happened to Objectivity?. Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics. Edited by Angela R. Miles and Geraldine Finn. Black Rose Books: Montreal. 1982. 145-173. Lugones, Maria C. and Elizabeth V. Spelman. Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for â€Å"The Woman’s Voice.† Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy. Edited by Marilyn Pearsall. Wadsworth Publishing Company: California. 1986. 19-31. Whitbeck, Caroline. Theories of Sex Difference. Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy. Edited by Marilyn Pearsall. Wadsworth Publishing Company: California. 1986. 34-51.

Forensics 1.06 Critical Thinking

Review QuestionsWhat is forensic science? Forensic science is the application of science to the criminal justice system.What three tasks or responsibilities does a forensic scientist have? A forensic scientist can collect and analyze data from crime scenes, and train other law enforcement individuals. Forensic scientists can work in the lab, go out and collect data, or teach at colleges and universities.What criteria might be used to establish someone as an expert witness? Courts take in the educational degrees that the person has, any publications that they may have, how many years that they have been involved in their field, and any professional organizations that the person is a member of.What are two of the ways that a forensic pathologist might use to help determine the time of death? A forensic pathologist can use rigor mortis and liver mortis to figure out time of death.What does a forensic anthropologist do? A forensic anthropologist specializes in identifying and examining s keletons and skeletal remains.Critical Thinking Questions1) Why do you think it is so important to use proper methods when collecting evidence from a crime scene? It is important to use proper methods when collecting evidence so that you can be able to analyze it correctly and get the correct information. If you do not use proper methods and collect the wrong information, then even the most experienced forensic scientist cannot analyze it and the criminal will get away, and you will never know the truth of what happened.2) Why do you think forensic science has been increasingly used by the criminal justice system? I think that forensic science has been increasingly used by the criminal justice system because it is science, which is easier to analyze and to understand exactly why and how things happened. It also makes it easier because you’re not just listening to two sides of the story, or even one side of the story, and deciding from that. Instead, you’re using actual evidence to find out exactly what happened, which is what makes forensic science so effective, especially when used by the criminal justice system.3) Which of the forensic scientist’s responsibilities do you think would be the most challenging? Why? I think that the most difficult responsibility of a forensic scientist is being an expert witness. I think that it would be challenging because you’re testifying in a very important court case, you’re under pressure, and you cannot lie, leave out details, or stretch the truth. Whatever you say affects whether or not the criminal in the case is found guilty or walks free, which can be very stressful to think about.4) Which of the forensic scientist’s responsibilities do you think would be the most interesting to you? Why? I think that the most interesting responsibility of a forensic scientist would be analyzing the data. I would always want to be the one to piece together a puzzle, and to solve a crime to fig ure out exactly what happened in a case. I think that it would be challenging, but it would also be interesting to join in on a case and examine and analyze the data to figure different things out.5) Which of the specialty areas do you think you would most like to work in? Why? I would be more interested in participating and working in forensic pathology. I would really enjoy doing autopsies and finding out time of death and the cause of death of people. I would enjoy working with blood and tissue samples, and I would feel very accomplished when I finally solved a mystery.

Reardon v. U.S. Essay

Lien on real property created by CERCLA when Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determines that property owners may be liable for cleanup costs amounts to deprivation of a significant property interest within meaning of the due process clause. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,  § 107(l ), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.  § 9607(l ); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. Absence of notice and hearing may be justified by exigent circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 92k251.5 k. Procedural Due Process in General. Most Cited Cases Constitution allows the process due to be tailored to fit realities of the situation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. *1510 Lynn Wright, with whom Robin F. Price and Edwards and Angell, New York City, were on supplemental brief, for plaintiffs, appellants. George W. Van Cleve, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Barry Hartman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., George B. Henderson, II, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., Stephen L. Samuels, Steve C. Gold, Jacques B. Gelin, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Charles Openschowski, Office of Gen. Counsel, E.P.A. and Luis Rodriguez, Asst. Regional Counsel, E.P.A., Washington, D.C., were on supplemental brief, for defendants, appellees. OPINION EN BANC TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. After removing hazardous substances from property belonging to the Reardons, EPA filed a notice of lien on the property for the amount spent. See 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(l ). The Reardons sued to have the notice of lien removed, arguing that they were not liable for the cleanup costs, that the lien was  overextensive in that it covered parcels not involved in the clean-up, and that the filing of the lien notice without a hearing deprived them of property without due process. The district court, in Reardon v. United States, 731 F.Supp. 558 (D.Mass.1990), decided that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Reardons’ two statutory claims. It ruled that although jurisdiction existed to hear the constitutional claim, the filing of a lien did not amount to a taking of a significant property interest protected by the due process clause. It therefore denied the Reardons’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and dismissed their complaint. The Reardons appealed and a panel of this court ruled in their favor on statutory grounds. Reardon v. United States, 922 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.1990) (withdrawn). We now consider the appeal en banc. After closely considering applicable law, including most notably the recent case of Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), we conclude that the district court correctly decided that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the Reardons’ statutory claims, but we find that the CERCLA lien provisions do violate the fifth amendment due process clause. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts. In 1979, Paul and John Reardon purchased a 16-acre parcel in Norwood, Massachusetts, adjacent to an electric equipment manufacturing plant site *1511 known as the â€Å"Grant Gear† site, and named it â€Å"Kerry Place.† In 1983, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, responding to a report of a nearby resident, tested soil samples from both properties and discovered extremely high levels of polychlorinated biphenyls (â€Å"PCBs†) on the Grant Gear site and on Kerry Place where it bordered Grant Gear. EPA then investigated the site. Finding the same high levels of PCBs, it authorized an immediate clean-up of the contaminated areas. Between June 25 and August 1, 1983, EPA removed 518 tons of contaminated soil from the two properties. It then notified the Reardons that it had removed all soil with concentrations of PCBs known to be above the safe limit, but informed them that additional areas of contamination might exist, in whi ch case EPA might undertake additional clean-up work. In 1984, the Reardons subdivided Kerry Place into a number of parcels; they sold five of those parcels and retained ownership of the others. In October 1985, EPA notified the Reardons that, as current owners of Kerry Place, they might be liable under  §Ã‚ § 106  and 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (â€Å"CERCLA†), 42 U.S.C.  §Ã‚ § 9606 & 9607, along with ten other present and prior owners of the properties, for the clean-up costs. In August 1987, EPA again investigated the properties to assess the feasibility of a long-term remedy for any remaining contamination. New testing showed that soil in several areas on Kerry Place was still contaminated with PCBs. In April 1988, EPA informed the Reardons of these results. The Reardons told EPA that they intended to clean up their property themselves. EPA advised the Reardons to coordinate any offsite disposal plans with EPA and to obtain EPA’s approval of a treatment or disposal facility. In January 1989, the Reardons informed EPA that they had completed their own clean-up of Kerry Place, without having attempted coordination with or sought the approval of EPA. On March 23, 1989, EPA filed a notice of lien with the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds pursuant to  § 107(l ) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(l ), on all of the Kerry Place parcels still owned by the Reardons. The lien was for an unspecified amount, as it secured payment of â€Å"all costs and damages covered by† 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(l ) for which the Reardons were liable under  § 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(a). Five days later, EPA notified the Reardons that it had filed the notice of lien. On July 12, 1989, EPA informed the Reardons that they could settle EPA’s claims against them for $336,709, but noted that this amount did not limit the Reardons’ potential liability. On September 29, 1989, EPA selected a long-term remedy for the Kerry Place and Grant Gear sites estimated to cost $16,100,000. B. Procedural History. The Reardons filed a complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They argued that they were entitled to have the notice of lien removed for three reasons. First, the Reardons maintained that they qualified as â€Å"innocent landowners† under  § 107(b) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(b), and therefore were not liable for any clean-up costs. Second, 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(l ) provides for a lien on only that property â€Å"subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action,† 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(l )(1)(B); the Reardons claim that since some of their Kerry Place parcels were not â€Å"subject to or affected by† the clean-up, EPA erred in filing a notice of lien covering all of those parcels. Third, they asserted that EPA’s imposition of the lien without a hearing violated the due process clause of  the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court held that  § 113(h) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  § 9613(h), divested it of jurisdiction to hear the Reardons’ â€Å"innocent landowner† and â€Å"overbroad lien† claims. It found that the same section also purported to divest it of jurisdiction to hear the due process claim, but held that Congress was without power to place such a limitation on its jurisdiction. Turning to the merits of the due process claim, the *1512 district court held that the lien imposed by  § 107(l ) did not amount to a taking of a â€Å"significant property interest† protected by the due process clause. The court therefore denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. The Reardons appealed, and a panel of this court found in their favor. The panel opinion construed  § 9613(h) so as to permit judicial review of the statutory challenges to the lien, and did not reach the due process issue. In response to EPA’s petition for rehearing, however, a majority of the court voted to grant a rehearing en banc. Although the court en banc finds for the plaintiffs, as did the panel, we do so on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. II. JURISDICTION [1] We turn first to the question of jurisdiction. The district court, as we have noted, held that 42 U.S.C.  § 9613(h) purported to divest it of jurisdiction over all three of the Reardons’ claims. We agree that  § 9613(h) bars review of the â€Å"innocent landowner† and â€Å"overbroad lien† claims, prior to the commencement of an enforcement or recovery action, but we conclude that this section does not bar review of the due process claim. Section 9613(h), entitled â€Å"Timing of review,† explicitly limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear certain cases arising under CERCLA. The section states, in part: No federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law †¦ to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except one of the following: [listing 5 enumerated types of actions] 42 U.S.C.  § 9613(h). The five exceptions to the jurisdictional bar are all actions filed by the government or by a private citizen seeking to enforce or recover costs for the enforcement of CERCLA; for this reason, the district court described  § 9613(h) as barring â€Å"judicial review of EPA actions prior to the time that the EPA or a third  party undertakes a legal action to enforce an order or to seek recovery of costs for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site.† Reardon v. United States, 731 F.Supp. at 564 n. 8. As a convenient shorthand, we will say that  § 9613(h) bars â€Å"pre-enforcement review† of certain claims. The district court framed the question of jurisdiction as whether the filing of a lien constituted a â€Å"removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title.† As the district court noted, the terms â€Å"removal† and â€Å"remedial action† are defined terms under the CERCLA statute. 42 U.S.C.  §Ã‚ § 9601(23), (24). Another C ERCLA provision says that these terms â€Å"include enforcement activities related thereto.† 42 U.S.C.  § 9601(25) (emphasis added). The court found that placing a lien on property from which hazardous substances had been removed was a type of enforcement activity. It therefore concluded that any challenge the Reardons could make, whether statutory or constitutional, was a â€Å"challenge[ ] to [a] removal or remedial action† over which Congress intended it not to have jurisdiction unless and until EPA brought an enforcement action. Reardon v. United States, 731 F.Supp. at 569. A. Jurisdiction over the â€Å"innocent landowner† and â€Å"overbroad lien† claims. We agree with the district court that filing a lien notice is a type of â€Å"enforcement activity† related to a removal or remedial action. And we agree that  § 9613(h) bars the federal courts from hearing pre-enforcement challenges to the merits of any particular lien–challenges, for example, to the liability which a lien secures, or to the conformity of that lien to the CERCLA lien provisions. Several considerations l ead to these conclusions. First, we think that the language of the statute, read for its ordinary meaning, supports such an interpretation. Central to the entire CERCLA scheme is a provision that makes certain parties liable for the cost of removal and remedial actions. See 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(a). When the government files a lien on property to secure payment of that liability, it can reasonably be described as seeking to enforce the liability *1513 provision. Thus, the activity of filing liens is, in ordinary language, an â€Å"enforcement activity.† Second, we believe that allowing challenges to the merits of particular liens would defeat some of the purposes of barring pre-enforcement review under  § 9613(h). Congress was no doubt concerned, first and foremost, that clean-up of substances that endanger public health would be delayed if EPA were forced to litigate each detail of its removal  and remedial plans before implementing them. Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated that  § 9613(h) barred pre-enforcement review because such review would be a significant obstacle to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders. Pre-enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in providing cleanups, would increase response costs, and would discourage settlement and voluntary cleanups. S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985). As long as the remedy upon review of a lien was limited to the invalidation or modification of the lien, of course, such review would not directly delay clean-up of hazardous substances. However, we do not believe that avoiding delay was the only purpose of postponing review. As the Fifth Circuit stated in a similar case: Although review in the case at hand would not delay actual cleanup of hazardous wastes, it would force the EPA–against the wishes of Congress–to engage in â€Å"piecemeal† litigation and use its resources to protect its rights to recover from any [potentially responsible party] filing such a[n] action. . . . . . Moreover, the crazy-quilt litigation that could result from allowing [potentially responsible parties] to file declaratory judgment actions prior to the initiation of government cost recovery actions could force the EPA to confront inconsistent results. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir.1989). The same practical considerations weigh against allowing pre-enforcement review in this case. And we add to these reasons one more: information needed to decide legal challenges to liens may not be available at the time such challenges are made. To decide, for example, the Reardons’ claim that they are innocent landowners, a court must determine whether the contamination pre-dated their ownership; whether they had any knowledge or reason to know of the contamination; whether they had exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances; and whether they took precautions to prevent releases by foreseeable acts of third parties. See 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(a), (b)(3), EPA Supplemental Brief, at 16-17 (stressing complexity of resolving innocent landowner claim). Notices of liens are likely to be filed early in the history of a response action–shortly after EPA has begun to spend money on waste removal and the  landowner has been notified of potential responsibility. See 42 U.S.C.  § 9607(l ) (providing for creation and filing of liens). At that point, EPA is likely not yet to know the full extent of the contamination, let alone when that contamination occurred, or whether it is likely that the owner exercised due care or took reasonable precautions. One purpose of  § 9613(h), we believe, is to delay review until enough is known to decide these issues. Third, legislative history supports the view that  § 9613(h) is intended to bar challenges to liability, such as the Reardons seek to make by attacking the lien filing, as well as challenges to the remedy EPA has chosen. During floor debate on this section, Senator Thurmond, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, which drafted the section, explained: Citizens, including potentially responsible parties, cannot seek review of the response action or their potential liability for a response action –other than in a suit for contribution–unless the suit falls within one of the categories in this section†¦. 132 Cong.Rec. S14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (emphasis added). Senator Stafford, *1514 Chairman of the Conference Committee, stated: â€Å"When the essence of a lawsuit involves the contesting [of] the liability of the plaintiff for cleanup costs, the courts are to apply the provisions of section 113(h), delaying such challenges until the Government has filed a suit.† 132 Cong.Rec. S14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (emphasis added). It is certainly possible that Congress inadvertently rather than purposefully included lien challenges in the judicial review bar. Congress amended the scope of â€Å"removal† and â€Å"remedial† actions to include â€Å"enforcement activities related thereto† primarily to ensure that EPA could â€Å"recover costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible parties.† H.R.Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2835, 2848-49; see H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3276, 3278 (â€Å"This amendment clarifies and confirms that [enforcement activity] costs are recoverable from responsible parties.†). Perhaps Congress did not realize that other provisions referring to removal and remedial actions–such as the judicial review bar–would also be affected. But even if this were so, we do not see how our conclusion is altered. First, as outlined above, reading the statute to bar review of pre- enforcement challenges to liens is consistent with the language and the purpose of the judicial bar. Second, and more importantly,  Congress amended a definitional section, thus changing the meaning of â€Å"removal† and â€Å"remedial† wherever they appear in CERCLA. We cannot give the definition inconsistent readings within the statute. As the above-quoted legislative history makes clear, the 1986 amendment was certainly intended to allow the government to collect attorney’s fees in cost recovery actions. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F.Supp. 977, 997 (D.N.H.1988) (allowing attorney’s fees to United States under  § 9607(a)(4)(A)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir.1990). If liens to ensure the government’s complete recovery of its remedial costs are not â€Å"enforcement activities† related to the removal or remedial action–the view suggested by the dissent–then we do not see how a suit to recover the government’s clean up costs is an â€Å"enforcement activit[y]† either. And if â€Å"enforcement activities† in  § 9601(25) is interpreted to exclude the expenses of cost recovery actions, this would have the effect of denying the government significant amounts of attorney’s fees– which was certainly not the intent of Congress. We therefore conclude, as did the district court, that  § 9613(h) precludes judicial review of the imposition of a lien until EPA commences an enforcement action. [2] B. Jurisdiction over the due process claim. Unlike the district court, however, we do not believe that  § 9613(h) precludes federal court jurisdiction over the Reardons’ due process claim. First, such a challenge does not fit into the literal language of  § 9613(h). That section refers to â€Å"challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title.† Under our reading, it divests federal courts of jurisdiction over challenges to EPA’s administration of the statute–claims that EPA did not â€Å"select[ ] † the proper â€Å"removal or remedial action,† in light of the standards and constraints established by the CERCLA statutes. The Reardons’ due process claim is not a challenge to the way in which EPA is administering the statute; it does not concern the merits of any particular removal or remedial action. Rather, it is a challenge to the CERCLA statute itself–to a statutory scheme under which the government is authorized to file lien notices without any hearing on the validity of the lien. Second, we read  § 9613(h) in light of the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated pronouncement that â€Å"where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional  claims its intent to do so must be clear.† Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2053-54, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988); see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); *1515 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). [FN1] We do not believe that the statute expresses a clear congressional intent to preclude the type of constitutional claim the Reardons are making–a challenge to several statutory provisions which form part of CERCLA. However, it is important to make clear that we are not holding that all constitutional challenges involving CERCLA fall outside the scope of  § 9613(h). A constitutional challenge to EPA administration of the statute may be subject to  § 9613(h)’s strictures. Such a claim may well be a â€Å"challenge[ ] to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title,† and may thus fall within  § 9613(h)’s bar. We find only that a constitutional challenge to the CERCLA statute is not covered by  § 9613(h). FN1. Of course,  § 9613(h) is styled as a provision that merely delays review, rather than precludes it–indeed, it is titled â€Å"Timing of review.† However, the only available review of the lien notice is in an enforcement action brought by EPA; and the judgment in that enforcement action will render moot the Reardons’ due-process-based request for injunctive relief against the filing of the lien, since it will decide whether or not the Reardons are liable under CERCLA. Hence, the effect of  § 9613(h) is to preclude review altogether. Third, extending jurisdiction to the Reardons’ due process claim does not necessarily run counter to the purposes underlying  § 9613(h). For example, resolution of the due process issue does not require any information that is not likely to be available until clean-up of a site is finished. Because it is a purely legal issue, its resolution in a pre-enforcement proceeding does not have the potential to force EPA to confront inconsistent results (as would a finding, for example, that a particular spill was caused by an act of God). Of course, if we decide that filing a notice of a CERCLA lien without any pre- enforcement review does violate due process, EPA’s collection efforts will no doubt be hampered. However, we do not lightly assume that Congress intended to ease EPA’s path even at the expense of  violating the Constitution. Fourth, although the two courts that have considered this issue have reached a different conclusion, see Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Re illy, 927 F.2d 289, 293 (6th Cir.1991); South Macomb Disposal Authority v. U.S.E.P.A., 681 F.Supp. 1244, 1249-51 (E.D.Mich.1988), we are unpersuaded by the reasoning of those cases. Our disagreement commences with the phrasing of the issue to be decided. Both courts frame the question as whether  § 9613(h) â€Å"prohibits constitutional as well as statutory challenges until the time pr[e]scribed by the statute.† South Macomb, 681 F.Supp. at 1249-50; see Barmet, 927 F.2d at 292. We think that this question fails to make the distinction we have noted above, see pp. 1514-1515, supra, between two types of constitutional challenges–challenges to EPA’s administration of CERCLA, and challenges to CERCLA itself. Once we recognize this distinction, the reasoning of these two courts becomes less convincing. First, says the South Macomb court, Reading the language of  § 9613(h) for its everyday meaning supports the notion that this subsection prohibits constitutional as well as statutory challenges until the time pr[e]scribed by the statute. The provision explicitly states that federal courts shall not have jurisdiction to review â€Å"any challenge† except for those enumerated. South Macomb, 681 F.Supp. at 1249- 50. But, the statute does not bar â€Å"any challenge,† without qualification; rather, it delays federal court review of â€Å"any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title.† 42 U.S.C.  § 9613(h). Because a due process challenge to the CERCLA lien provisions is not, we believe, a challenge to â€Å"removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title,† we do not find that the â€Å"everyday meaning† of  § 9613(h) divests the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear such a challenge. Both the Barmet and South Macomb courts contend that legislative history–House and Senate Reports, and House Judiciary Committee Hearings– suggests that Congress intended  § 9613(h) to bar all pre-enforcement challenges, including all *1516 constitutional challenges. Upon examination, we find these materials unconvincing as well. The Senate Report states, in part: As several courts have noted, the scheme and purposes of CERCLA would be disrupted by affording review of orders or response actions prior to commencement of a government enforcement or cost recovery action. See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, [600 F.Supp. 1487 (D.N.J.1985) ]. These cases  correctly interpret CERCLA with regard to the unavailability of pre-enforcement review. This amendment [ § 9613(h) ] is to expressly recognize that pre-enforcement review would be a significant obstacle to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders. Pre- enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in providing cleanups, would increase response costs, and would discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups. S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985). We see nothing in this discussion which would indicate an intent to divest federal courts of jurisdiction to consider a claim that the provisions of CERCLA itself authorize deprivations of property without due process of law. On the contrary, the reference to â€Å"review of orders or response actions† suggests that the writers of the Senate Report focused their concern on the problems that would arise if courts reviewed the merits of particular EPA actions. Both Barmet and South Macomb attach great weight to the Senate Report’s citation â€Å"with approval† of Lone Pine, a case decided before  § 9613(h) was enacted, which they say held that CERCLA did not allow pre- enforcement review even of constitutional challenges. We think there are good reasons to discount this citation. For one thing, the 13-page opinion in Lone Pine contains no discussion of the question whether constitutional challenges to the statute as well as challenges to administrative action are barred; one can only infer that the Lone Pine court held this view from the facts that (1) the plaintiff’s complaint had one constitutional count alongside six statutory counts, and (2) the court dismissed the entire complaint. In fact, Lone Pine cites Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F.Supp. 69, 72 (C.D.Cal.1984), the leading case holding that CERCLA did not bar jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to the statute; and it does so, not to indicate any disagreement with that holding, but simply to agree with its holding that CERCLA does bar pre-enforcement review of administrative orders. See Lone Pine, 600 F.Supp. at 1497. For another thing, the Senate Report does not cite Lone Pine for the proposition that federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges; rather, it cites it solely as an example of a group of cases, sub silentio holding that review â€Å"of orders or response actions† would disrupt the purposes of CERCLA. We do not see why this should indicate agreement with Lone Pine’s purported holding regarding constitutional challenges,  particularly since cases such as Aminoil would seem to fit just as easily into the group of cases described in the Report. We do not find the House Report any more convincing. The pertinent passage in that Report, according to Barmet and South Macomb, is a statement that â€Å"there is no right of judicial review of the Administrator’s selection and implementation of response actions until after the response action[s] have been completed†¦.† H.R.Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2835, 2863. See Barmet, 927 F.2d at 293 (quoting this passage); South Macomb, 681 F.Supp. at 1250 (same). This statement says nothing about judicial review of the CERCLA statute itself. South Macomb also cites testimony of EPA and Justice Department officials during hearings on the bill that contained  § 9613(h). In response to a query from Representative Glickman as to whether EPA and the Justice Department â€Å"might accept some form of accelerated [pre-enforcement] review,† Mr. Habicht, the Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resources, replied: Mr. Chairman, briefly, this issue has been litigated under the 1980 statute *1517 quite extensively, and there have been a number of decisions over the last several months that address the fundamental questions of the constitutionality of the procedures set forth in that law. Virtually across the board now the courts are finding that the scheme is constitutional as currently constituted. Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations, H. of Rep. Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 226 (July 17, 1985); see South Macomb, 681 F.Supp. at 1250 (quoting this passage). The South Macomb court comments: â€Å"Our reading of this exchange is that the EPA and the Department of Justice took the position that because the courts had already upheld the constitutionality of CERCLA, constitutional challenges could also await EPA enforcement actions.† Id. We do not find this passage quite so clear. It would appear to be an expression of hope by EPA and the Department of Justice rather than a statement of congressional intent, particularly in light of the fact that Congress passed a provision,  § 9613(h), that by its language does not bar constitutional challenges to the CERCLA statute. Finally, the Supreme Court recently examined a statute with a judicial review provision not unlike the CERCLA section analyzed here. At issue in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112  L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), was a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act barring judicial review of a denial of â€Å"Special Agriculture Worker† (â€Å"SAW†) status except in the context of a deportation order. The statute states: â€Å"There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection.† 8 U.S.C.  § 1160(e) (as amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986). The Court held that this bar did not preclude review of â€Å"general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications.† McNary, 111 S.Ct. at 896. Rather, it only barred review of individual denials of SAW status. Id. The statute in McNary resembles the CERCLA provision at issue here in two respects. First, as here, judicial review of an administrative event is withheld until the agency instigates a second, independent proceeding. More significantly, the immigration statute is phrased so as to bar review of the agency’s determination of SAW status in an individual action–an event comparable to EPA’s selection of a removal or remedial action, which is the focus of the CERCLA bar. Neither statute mentions the availability of review of a constitutional challenge to the statute itself (as here) or to the agency’s execution of the statute (as in McNary ). Insofar as the Immigration and Nationality Act compares to CERCLA, we think that the holding in McNary supports our conclusion here. See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute). Thus, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the Reardons’ due process claim: that the CERCLA statutory scheme under which liens may be imposed on property without opportunity for a hearing violates the fifth amendment due process clause. III. THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM [4] The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis of due process challenges to statutes which, like this one, involve property rather than liberty interests. One must first ask whether the statute authorizes the taking of a â€Å"significant property interest† protected by the fifth  amendment. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1997, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). If there is no significant property interest involved, the inquiry is at an end. If there is, one proceeds to examine what process is due in the particular circumstances. *1518 E.g., id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). We shall address each issue in turn. A. The Deprivation. The district court, relying primarily on Spielman- Fond, Inc. v. Hanson’s, Inc., 379 F.Supp. 997 (D.Ariz.1973) (three judge panel), aff’d mem., 417 U.S. 901, 94 S.Ct. 2596, 41 L.Ed.2d 208 (1974), found that the filing of a federal lien under 42 U.S.C.  § 96 07(l ) did not amount to a deprivation of a significant property interest; thus, the court did not reach the second step of the analysis. However, a Supreme Court case decided after the district court had issued its decision (indeed, after oral argument at the en banc rehearing of this appeal) has clarified the law in this area considerably, and has precluded continued reliance on the Court’s summary affirmance in Spielman-Fond. In Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), a unanimous Court held that a Connecticut attachment statute violated the due process clause. The Court held that the attachment lien on plaintiff Doehr’s real property deprived him of a significant property interest within the meaning of the due process clause. The Court stated: For a property owner like Doehr, attachment ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause. Doehr, 501 U.S. at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 2113. It concluded that â€Å"even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process protection.† Id. (emphasis added). And, in a footnote, it disposed of its summary affirmance in Spielman-Fond by noting that â€Å"[a] summary disposition does not enjoy the full precedential value of a case argued on the merits and disposed of by a written opinion.† Id. at —- n. 4, 111 S.Ct. at 2113 n. 4 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1359-60, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). See also id. at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 2113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (Spielman-Fond should not be read to mean that the imposition of a lien is not a deprivation of a significant interest in property). Whether the response costs were incurred consistently with the national contingency plan is an issue which may be highly factual, but it is usually a matter of the amount, and not the existence, of liability. More likely to be â€Å"highly factual† is the determination whether certain of the owner’s parcels of land are â€Å"subject to or affected by† EPA’s response action. Similarly, on the issue of the landowner’s liability, EPA admits in its brief that the â€Å"concepts of due care, foreseeability, objective and subjective knowledge, some of which are unique in CERCLA to the innocent landowner defense, are extremely fact-intensive.† EPA Supplementary Brief at 16-17. Second, we must consider what procedural safeguards, if any, CERCLA provides against erroneous filing of a lien. a. The right to a judicial hearing. CERCLA provides no such safeguards. It provides for no pre-deprivation proceedings at all–not even the ex parte â€Å"probable cause† hearing judged insufficient in Doehr. See Doehr at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 2108 (describing Connecticut attachment procedure). Nor does CERCLA provide for an immediate post-deprivation hearing. [FN2] The first hearing the property owner is likely to get is at the enforcement proceeding, or cost recovery action, brought by EPA. This action may be brought several years after the notice of lien is filed; it is limited only by a rather complicated statute of  limitations, see 42 U.S.C.  § 9613(g)(2), which gives EPA three years after a removal action is completed or six years after a remedial action is commenced to bring such a suit. The running of the statute of limitations is entirely within EPA’s control. Since the government may take its own sweet time before suing, and since the removal or remedial action may itself take years to complete, the lien may be in place for a considerable time without an opportunity for a hearing. FN2. The Connecticut statute at issue in Doehr provided â€Å"expeditious† post-attachment review, see 501 U.S. at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 2115, but the Court nonetheless found the statute constitutionally deficient. Even under Doehr, though, post-attachment process is not always inadequate. Doehr notes the factors leading to the Court’s  approval, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895 (1974), of a sequestration statute with no pre-deprivation review: â€Å"the plaintiff had a vendor’s lien to protect, the risk of error was minimal because the likelihood of recovery involved uncomplicated matters that lent themselves to documentary proof, and plaintiff was required to put up a bond.† Doehr, 501 U.S. at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 2114. â€Å"[M]ere postponement of judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.† *1520 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596, 51 S.Ct. 608, 611, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931). But the CERCLA statute of limitations on liens throws the â€Å"ultimate judicial determination† so far into the future as to render it inadequate. Indeed, in this respect the CERCLA scheme resembles the replevin statutes in Fuentes v. Shevin, where the Court held that the debtor may not be â€Å"left in limbo to await a hearing that might or might not ‘eventually’ occur.† Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 618, 94 S.Ct. at 1905 (discussing Fuentes v. Shevin ). b. Posting of a Bond. The Court has recognized that requiring the filing party to post a bond may provide the property owner important protection against wrongful filing; in Doehr, four members of the Court suggested that due process always requires a plaintiff’s bond in the context of an attachment. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at  Ã¢â‚¬â€-, 111 S.Ct. at 2116 (plurality). CERCLA does not require EPA to post a bond when filing the notice of federal lien. c. Action for damages. In Doehr, the State of Connecticut argued that the availability of a double damages remedy for suits that are commenced without probable cause was an important protection against misuse of the attachment provisions; however, four members of the Court did not find the availability of such a suit to be an adequate procedural safeguard. Four members of the court explained in detail why an action for damages would never prove adequate: The necessity for at least a prompt postattachment hearing is self-evident because the right to be compensated at the end of the case, if the plaintiff loses, for all provable injuries caused by the attachment is inadequate to redress the harm inflicted, harm that could have been avoided had an early hearing been held. An individual with an immediate need or opportunity to sell a property can neither do so, nor otherwise satisfy that need or recreate the opportunity. The same applies to a parent in need of a home equity loan for a child’s education, an entrepreneur seeking to start a business on the strength of an otherwise strong credit rating, or simply a homeowner who might face the disruption of having a mortgage placed in technical default. Doehr, 501 U.S. at —-, 111 S.Ct. at 2118 (plurality).